The role of the Minister in driving innovation: some post-Ministerial perspectives on creating public value by Andrews, Leighton
The role of the Minister in driving innovation: some post-Ministerial perspectives on creating 
public value 
 
Work in progress – not for citing without permission 
 
Professor Leighton Andrews, 
Cardiff Business School. 
 
AndrewsL7@cardiff.ac.uk 
 
Aberconway Building, 
Colum Drive, 
Cardiff 
CF10 3EU 
  
Abstract 
Political leadership in public service innovation, including Ministerial leadership, has arguably been 
given less attention in academic literature than managerial leadership. To analyse the role of a 
Government Minister in driving innovation, it is necessary to consider the specific job of the minister 
as a leader of a public service system - for example, in education, in health, or in local government. 
While this role will always be bounded by situation or context - temporal and systemic conditions, 
including the minister's responsibilities to a party, its manifesto or programme for government, by 
their collective responsibility as a member of a Cabinet, by financial considerations, and by the 
structural and legal limitations of the role - Ministers have operational space within their specific 
portfolios to consider how to develop innovative approaches.  Their role as political leaders can be a 
factor in driving or motivating innovative approaches across a system. Moving beyond political 
biography, but drawing on direct ministerial experience within the Welsh Government between 
2007 and 2016, and the emerging literature on political leadership and public service innovation, this 
paper will explore what can be learned by considering the leadership role of a minister in the context 
of a professional system. Paradoxically, public service innovation is not novel: the paper will also 
make suggestions on how analysing the history of public service developments can provide insights 
into the role of Ministers who were innovators when old institutions were new. Public value has 
historically been created by governments that were open to innovation and prepared to allow their 
ministers to innovate, to encourage others who could, or to adapt ideas from those who had. 
  
Introduction - Political Leadership and Innovation  
 
What do we know of the role of ministers or political leaders in driving innovation? And does it 
matter? Mulgan (2015, p.xvii) says ‘parties and governments often struggle to ear what is happening 
on the ground, and those on the ground often struggle to understand how the world looks to a 
minister or a global agency’. Meanwhile, political leadership has been ‘under-theorised and under-
researched’ (Hartley, 2010, p146); political innovations have been under-researched (Sorensen, 
2017); and the contribution of innovation to the creation of public value has arguably been under-
theorised (Hartley, 2011). It is perhaps therefore not surprising that the role of political leaders in 
driving innovation has itself both been under-theorised and under-researched. The well-known UK 
Cabinet Office Strategy Unit paper Innovation in the Public Sector (Mulgan and Albury, 2003) 
suggests 7 specific roles ‘for ministers and political leaders in fostering innovation’. These involve: 
 Setting and relentlessly communicating clear and aspirational outcomes for the 
organisations and areas for which they are responsible 
 Creating and exemplifying a culture which encourages new ideas wherever they may come 
from 
 Creating the legislative and policy framework to promote experimentation and piloting 
 Supporting and defending experiments and high risk pilots 
 Viewing national, regional and organisational devolution as ‘laboratories of innovation’ 
 Galvanising others, championing and chivvying promising innovations 
 Developing visionary goals and driving them through (e.g. John F. Kennedy’s ‘Man on the 
Moon in a decade’) 
 
The focus is on a variety of roles: setting stretch targets, developing an open culture, creating the 
institutional base, advocacy, accepting diversity and experimentation, motivational leadership, and 
providing vision. Despite this, the engagement of ministers in fostering innovation has been little 
studied. Borins (2014) identifies a higher level of engagement in innovations by politicians in the 
2010 Harvard Innovation awards, both In terms of legislative and executive innovation (pp65-6). His 
analysis suggests politicians are involved when there is a crisis, but not when there is a problem to 
be solved. He also identifies the role of political leaders in innovations (p.76). He identifies politicians 
as acknowledging the role of political leaders in supporting their innovations, and identifyiespublic 
support as important (p.78-9). He speculates that in a period of crisis, political capital might be seen 
to be gained by being a source of new ideas.  
Sorensen (2017) calls for study of the political context of innovation, including politicians’ support 
for bottom-up innovations initiated by employees, and also for study of political innovations 
themselves. She stresses the need for both theory building and empirical research. In the context of 
recent new thinking about political leadership, this paper seeks to identify some of the issues 
involved in theprising the role of ministers in innovation. One of the co-authors of the UK Cabinet 
Paper, Geoff Mulgan, has himself subsequently said that he was ‘disappointed that no ministers or 
senior officials showed much interest in this agenda’ in the UK, pointing to more positive reception 
in northern Europe, Asia and North America. (Mulgan, 2007; see also Ball and Exley, 2010).  
Sorensen (2017) identifies three forms of innovation: innovations in polity; innovations in politics, 
and innovations in policy.  In this paper I will reflect on my own ministerial experience in the Welsh 
Government in the context of the political leadership roles suggested in the UK Cabinet paper. The 
Welsh Government, along with the National Assembly for Wales, is an innovation in polity: the 
National Assembly, endorsed by a referendum in 1997 (and reinforced in a further referendum in 
2011), it is the only political institution for which the people of Wales have ever voted. It has been 
responsible for innovations in politics and policy, but it has also been prepared to learn from 
elsewhere (Andrews, 2015). However, it is also under-researched and under-theorised. Indeed, so 
far, only two first-hand accounts by former ministers have been published, one of them 
posthumously (Andrews, 2014; Morgan, 2017), leading researchers to complain (see Lynch, 2006) 
about the paucity of material available. In respect of innovation in Wales, Boyne et al’s 2005 study of 
innovation in Welsh Local Government looks at processes in local government which were largely 
undertaken before devolution. Gatehouse and Price’s 2013 assessment for Nesta is a useful 
overview but inevitably subjective in its selection. 
Hartley (2010) has identified as one of the challenges of looking at political leadership is the 
disconnect between leadership theory and political science theory: Sorensen (2017) says that 
political innovations remain ‘a relatively unexplored research area’ because of disciplinary 
boundaries between public administration and political science and says research on political 
innovation needs a multi-disciplinary approach. Both observations are of course directly relevant to 
consideration of the role of political leaders in innovation. First, I will look at some of the conceptual 
issues involved, drawing on existing literature in respect of Innovation, public value, ministerial roles, 
system leadership; then I will take examples from the Welsh experience; finally, I will set this against 
the specific roles identified in the 2003 Cabinet Office paper, assessing points of confirmation or 
irrelevance, and also looking at whether the evidence reveals omissions. I conclude with suggestions 
for further research.  
The language of innovation 
Innovation has become one of the buzz-words of public administration over the last twenty years. 
Though some (e.g. Bevir and Rhodes, 2010:128) identify it with the New Labour period of 
government (1997-2007), barely had Tony Blair been elected Labour Leader of the Opposition when, 
in a review of New Public Management (NPM), Dunleavy and Hood (1994) were already identifying 
‘NPM innovations’. Osborne and Brown (2011) trace ‘innovation’ back to the New Right think-tanks 
of the 1980s. Pollitt and Hupe (2011) call it one of the ‘magic concepts’ of public administration that 
is adopted because it conveys ‘a vague, fuzzy meaning and positive connotations’ (Sorensen, 2017). 
Innovation suffuses the bible of the Clinton-Gore era, Reinventing Government, which is best 
developed, it is said, by decentralised government. (Osborne and Gaebler, 1993). Borins (2014,pp2-
3) firmly identifies the origins of Innovation commentary in public service with the NPM tradition in 
the UK and New Zealand in the 1980s and the ‘Reinventing Government’ movement in the United 
States. So do Sorensen and Torfing (2015, p148).  
Tony Blair (Dudman, 2017) has complained that the ‘Reinventing Government’ movement has died 
away recently, though I would argue that its influence can be seen in some of the UK coalition 
government’s initiatives (Andrews, 2017), including the launch of the Behavioural Insights Team and 
the development of the Government Digital Service (GDS), both of which have been copied 
elsewhere around the world. Finlayson (2000) locates the cultural thinking behind New Labour in ‘a 
set of arguments concerning ‘post-Fordism, some of which were initiated under the banner of ‘New 
Times’ as waved by the Communist Party in the 1980s and disseminated through Marxism Today.’ 
He terms it ‘the Demos tendency’, after a prominent new Labour think-tank whose origins can be 
linked to Marxism Today and ‘New Times’. It is certainly possible to argue that the confusion of 
‘novelty’ and ‘innovation’ derives from this period. New Labour’s focus on ‘Modernising 
Government’ (White Paper, 1999) can be read in this context of what Finlayson calls ‘permanent 
innovation’ (p191). Social entrepreneurs have complained ‘what is meant by new and innovative – 
why do funders require this constant focus on new and innovative – what about tried and tested’ 
(Jervis, 2008). As former Labour minister Chris Mullin (2011, p404) has observed:  
The New Labour obsession with innovation afflicts much of the voluntary sector. Tried and 
tested, well-established projects are dying on their feet while endless sums are lavished on 
bright new wheezes that flash across the firmament and disappear quicker than you can say 
‘tick that box’’. 
There is certainly a danger of what I would call ‘innovation fatigue’. Borins (2006,p7) recognises ‘in 
all likelihood, we as a society do not want a public sector that is as unrelentingly innovative as the 
private sector, nor one that displays the volatility of an Internet start-up.’  
For all that it is a buzzword in modern public administration, the word ‘Innovation’ was never one of 
those words which Welsh cultural critic Raymond Williams (1976, 1979) identified as the ‘Keywords’ 
– words ‘which involve ideas and values’. But Williams does discuss Innovation in the context of his 
discussion of ‘creative’: 
The word puts a necessary stress on originality and innovation, and when we remember the 
history we can see that these are not trivial claims. Indeed, we try to clarify this by 
distinguishing between innovation and novelty, though novelty has both serious and trivial 
senses.  
Borins’ study of the 2010 Harvard innovation awards notes that novelty is important to this specific 
innovation awards programme, (2014, p62) – that novelty may be the implementation of an 
innovation that exists in another public service institution, but is novel to the specific organisation 
submitting it for an award. He recognises that novelty alone could simply mean the development of 
vanity projects (109). 
Schlesinger (2007) identified how creativity ‘established itself as a hegemonic term in an increasingly 
elaborated framework of policy ideas.’ He noted ‘a concerted effort is underway to shape a wide 
range of working practices by invoking creativity and innovation’. Schlesinger identified the 2005 Cox 
Review as a key source of definitions for ‘creativity’, ‘innovation’ and ‘design’. In that report, 
‘creativity’ was defined as ‘the generation of new ideas’: ‘innovation’ was defined as a process which 
meant ‘the successful exploitation of new ideas’ and ‘design’ was ‘what links creativity and 
innovation’. Design shaped ideas ‘to become practical and attractive propositions for users and 
customers’. Schlesinger noted that ‘the slogan about innovation as ‘the successful exploitation of 
ideas’ has become the mantra of the Office of Science and Innovation in the DTI’. Oakley et al (2014), 
quoting Schlesinger, suggest that innovation replaced creativity as having unquestioned ‘generalised 
value’ (Schlesinger, 2009). For Mulgan and Albury, creativity becomes innovation when a new idea is 
implemented. 
In that article Schlesinger mapped the intellectual export of ideas of creativity and innovation via a 
small but interconnected range of New Labour politicians and advisers: focussing on the IPPR and 
Demos, he has written ‘a New Labour policy generation emerged strongly shaped by their origins in 
think tanks’ (2009). Two of the figures he mentioned, Geoff Mulgan and Matthew Taylor, of course 
remain prominent in the field of public service innovation as respectively chief executives of Nesta 
and the RSA.  Nesta itself has been analysed as an example of a successful innovation organisation 
(Oakley et al, 2014). These links are comprehensively mapped in Ball and Exley (2010), who identify 
that ‘innovation, ‘next thinking’, experimentation and speculation are defining characteristics of the 
modes of practice within the networks’. They identify the emphasis within these networks on 
innovation infrastructures, intermediaries, brokers, incubators or accelerators, saying of within this 
network ‘innovation becomes a valued and valuable commodity’. Here we see how think-tanks and 
policy intellectuals have convening power in respect of the mobilisation, organisation and 
transference of innovative ideas. Power as a concept in diffusing management ideas has been 
analysed by O’Mahoney and Sturdy (2016), who examine the consultancy McKinsey, an adviser to 
governments around the world as well as private sector organisations. More worryingly, some now 
use ‘innovation’ as an ideological weapon: the ban on Uber announced by Transport for London and 
endorsed by London Mayor Sadiq Khan showed that London was closed to ‘business and innovation’ 
said the Conservative Minister for Innovation, Greg Hands (Schomberg, 2017).  O’Reilly et al (2010) 
warn of the danger of the emphasis of leadership becoming an industry of its own – or ‘leaderism’, 
as they call it. We also need to avoid ‘innovationism’. 
All of this points to the need for some refining of the notion of innovation as ‘the successful 
exploitation of new ideas’ where we have to have some sense of what constitutes success in time: 
that could be the durability or transferability of ideas, though this lies largely outside the focus of 
this paper. Roberts and King (1991, p150) identified four stages of innovation in the public sector: 
creation; design; implementation and institutionalisation – the last being the stage where the 
innovation has become established practice and so is no longer considered an innovative idea. Of 
course, innovations may be jettisoned, so the fourth stage should probably be refined as 
institutionalisation or abandonment: and others would add feedback loops and evaluation processes 
into the mix; meanwhile design thinking would suggest early-stage prototypes or beta versions, or 
the use of randomised control trials. But for evaluating the simpler question of whether an 
innovation is now established thinking, Roberts and King’s model, slightly modified, will probably do. 
Mulgan, in writing about strategy in government suggests that effective strategy means making 
decisions that would be seen as ‘passing the test of history: the best possible decisions in the light of 
what was known at the time’ (Mulgan 2004). Pollitt (2008, p174) stresses for a historic dimension to 
innovation: ‘innovation hunters need to learn from what has gone before as well as what is 
promised by the innovators of the day.’ 
Innovation and Public Value 
Sorensen (2017) says that political innovations ‘constitute new perceptions of what counts as public 
value’. How should we consider Innovation and its contribution to the creation of public value within 
the public sector? Hartley (2005) offered an inital typology which I have expressed as a table below: 
 
Type Example 
Product New instruments in hospital 
Service On-line tax forms 
Process Process mapping for new approaches 
Position New contexts or users – eg Connexions service 
Strategic New goals eg community policing 
Governance Devolved institutions 
Rhetorical Eg ‘Congestion charging’ 
 
Gatehouse and Price (2013) note how the Australian Public Service Network have envisaged a similar 
typology. Again, I express this as a table: 
Type Example 
Policy A change to policy thinking or behavioural 
intentions. 
Service A new or improved service. 
Service delivery A new or different way of providing a service. 
Administrative or organisational A new process 
Conceptual A new way of looking at problems, challenging 
current  assumptions, or both. 
Systemic A new or improved way for parts of the public 
sector to operate and interact with stakeholders.  
 
Clearly these innovations could be introduced at different levels within a service. From extensive 
Canadian research Borins has emphasized the significance of innovations originating from within a 
system. His work found that 50% of innovations originated from middle managers or front-line 
workers, 25% from agency heads, 20% from politicians, 15% from interest groups and 10 per cent 
from individuals outside government (individuals gave multiple answers, which explains the figure 
adding up to more than 100%). Borins notes that this is consistent with research in the private sector 
(Borins, 2000, 2001). This is not to say, however, that system-wide leadership is unnecessary. In his 
report for the IBM Center for The Business of Government, Borins identified the need for a systems 
approach based on a holistic analysis of challenges, rather than a silo-based one. (Borins, 2006, p9). 
He also stresses, and illustrates, the need for supportive leadership from the top. 
What are the requirements for ensuring that Innovation contributes to the creation of public value 
(Moore, 1995)? Moore outlined a ‘strategic triangle’ essential for determining successful public 
value strategy for public service organisations: 
 Clear objective that is ‘substantively valuable’ 
 That is ‘legitimate and politically sustainable’ 
 And ‘operationally and administratively feasible’ 
 
These themes, particularly te second, speak to the importance of political leadership and public 
leadership more widely. Borins (2014) notes Moore’s subsequent concept of a public value account 
and looks at whether the innovations from the Harvard awards scheme contribute to public value 
creation. In addition to the benefits of the innovations in themselves as judged by a variety of 
outcome measures, he also looks at external measures of value creation, including formal 
evaluations by government and academic organisations, transfer of the innovation, awards and 
media attention. Hartley and Downe (2007), Sorensen (2017) and other studies also accord 
‘diffusion’ of innovation as a success factor. 
Rhodes and Wanna (2007) rightly warn of the dangers of conflating unelected and elected leaders 
and of downgrading politics and the understanding of power. Andrews (2015a) points to the 
differences of role of politicians, public servants and executive board members. Danish local 
government chief executives (Forum Board, 2005 ) explicitly identified the necessity of clarifying 
their managerial space with the political leaders of their authorities as one of the nine elements of 
chief executive excellence. Hartley (2005) has pointed out that not all innovations generate public 
value. More recently (2011), she argues that interest from the top in how innovations are developed 
is important for public value creation. She points out that public service innovations can be ‘risky, 
ambiguous, multifaceted, complex and contested’, and says that ‘a public value perspective on 
innovation’ should research its potential for wider impact on economic, social and environmental 
well-being. This reinforces the need expressed by Borins for a system-wide perspective, but it is 
important to take on board Rhodes and Wanna’s urging that broad goals should be set by political 
leaders and public value should be ‘best regarded as a tool used by public servants to identify and 
implement operational improvements at the workplace (2007, p418). 
 
The role of Ministers in innovating across a system 
In their assessment of executive public service leaders in the United States and their contribution to 
Innovation, Doig and Hargrove (1987, p8) identify a number of roles against which their chosen 
leaders should be judged. Some of these, which relate to technologies of management control (for 
example, recruitment and key appointments), are only relevant to executive leaders who have 
organisational management responsibility, which political leaders in many systems, including the UK, 
do not have, or have in only very a constrained manner after a high degree civil service or officer 
filtering of job applications, with simply the option of a choice between two identified candidates, or 
an ‘accept or reject’ judgement on a single identified candidate. Ministers, in particular, operate in a 
form of power-dependency with officials (Richards, 2008; Smith, 1995), where their agency is 
bounded by expectations of external bodies (media, legislature, public)and by the ‘rules of the game’ 
(the structures of institutions, their accumulated histories, budgets, interests of other institutional 
actors) or by context (time/space/economic circumstances). However, some of the roles identified 
by Doig and Hargrove overlap with the cultural goals identified by Mulgan and Albury, including the 
setting of new missions and programmes for organisations, maintaining cultures open to new ideas, 
including new technologies and the requisite skills, and external promotion and validation of the 
organisation’s innovation goals. Borins (2002) addresses how political leaders can  
Ministers do have a degree of agency, however bounded, and it is important to consider the 
freedom of manoeuvre of ministers when evaluating their scope for introducing innovations in 
practice. Recent work by the Institute for Government (Hallsworth et al, 2011) suggested that 
‘ministers will usually tend to be the ones pushing for more innovative, risk taking options, with the 
civil service acting as a counter-balance.’ Ministerial and civil service accounts tend to privilege 
agency and personality, write Smith et al (1995), so it is the job of researchers to bring structure and 
constraint back into view. This is no surprise: political life requires individual entrepreneurialism, 
from building individual skills and capacity to achieve selection in a seat, to mobilising people in 
teams to help you win an election, to gaining recognition within a legislature or the media in order 
to earn the eye of a Prime or First Minister or their aides or their whips who might recommend you 
for promotion. ‘Political life’ say Rhodes and Bevir (2010, p197) ‘consists of meaningful activity’.  The 
privileging of agency narratives is accentuated by media needs often to tell a complex story in simple 
terms, and by the desire of a political Opposition to interpret accountability in terms of personal 
agency (Dunleavy, 1995). In the Westminster Model (Richards, 2008; Norton, 1999) ministers have 
the constitutional responsibility for their departments, and for their policy decisions, and officials are 
responsible for the implementation of policy – a narrative which it is in both their interests to 
maintain (Smith et al, 1995), though that narrative of ministerial responsibility had been modified by 
heads of the civil service over time (Theakston, 1995; Gray, 1985). It is widely accepted that, while 
structural constraints exist on ministers, they do have agency: as Smith (2008) says, they are 
‘individuals within an institutional setting who can exercise choice’. In the words of Bevir and Rhodes 
(2006), ministers have ‘situated agency’. They are situated within a context defined by a party 
programme, a history of prior policies, a balance of power within a Cabinet, particularly in a coalition 
context, and a budgetary framework (Laver and Schepsle, 1994).  
 
James (1992) says that ministers have been ‘more assertive in their departments’ since the 1970s. 
King (1994) says that to exercise the possibility of agency, ministers need both distinct policy ideas 
and a distinct ‘personal will to autonomy’. Headey (1974) argued that specialists in different policy 
areas had found evidence of ‘lack of innovation’ on the part of post-war governments, which he in 
part attributed to ministers lacking policy objectives. For Headey, certain kinds of ministers were 
however ‘policy initiators’. Marsh et al (2000) redefine that definition, identifying certain ministers 
who were clear ‘agenda setters’, who sought to change the broad agenda or policy line of their 
departments’. They argue that ministers have ‘a greater policy role now than previously’. It is 
precisely the growth of ‘activist ministers’ which is of concern to King and Crewe in their book on the 
blunders of British governments (King and Crewe, 2013). Many commentators have suggested that 
such activism has had an impact on the traditional ‘snag-hunting’ role of the civil service (eg 
Theakston, 1991, Smith et al, 1999). Du Gay (1996) has long warned of the dangers of the dangers of 
the entrepreneurial drive in government reform undermining the civic and ethical role of 
disinterested public service. One former head of the Prime Minister’s policy unit under Tony Blair, 
Matthew Taylor, wrote in a blog recently: 
If I was assessing departments today I’d start by asking every permanent secretary to 
give me examples of occasions on which, on the basis of their authority and expertise as 
independent advisers, officials persuaded a minister not to do or say something which 
the politician really wanted to do or say. To be fair, the whole point about such 
occasions is that we wouldn’t have heard about them. But perhaps in the context of so 
many examples of terrible ideas going unchallenged, the civil service should occasionally 
circulate a samizdat document entitled Stupid Stuff Whitehall Stopped (Taylor, 2015). 
 
A recent UK National Audit Office Report has suggested that ‘Permanent secretaries "lack 
confidence" and do not have the right incentives to challenge ministers when they are concerned 
about the value for money of government schemes, suggesting that there may be a conflict in their 
‘dual accountabilities’ as Accounting Officers for their departments but with accountability for 
delivery also to their Secretaries of State. (NAO, 2017) In recent years, there have been complaints 
about the quality of Government Department’s corporate memory (Andrews, 2014; Hillman, 2016, 
Willetts, 2017), which may itself be a factor in a decline in the snag-hunting role. Ministers are 
sometimes perceived to be too ready to re-organise or re-structure, for example (see Hallsworth et 
al, 2011) and officials are there to assess the risk of particular innovations for ministers.  
 
Ministers as system leaders 
In his defining study of leadership, James MacGregor Burns asks us to ‘consider the classic case of 
the young zealot, a rising leader of a new reform or left-wing cabinet, who is appointed head of a 
ministry of education’ (1978:p377). Such an executive leader, he suggests, is going to face challenges 
from within the department they head as well as from ‘unit leaders’ linked to interest groups – in 
this case professional organizations and unions – outside. I was an education minister (Andrews, 
2014) – perhaps not as young as Burns’ zealot - and I faced those challenges. I am still to find much 
written that is useful in respect of the role of a minister in respect of a department, or indeed the 
wider system to which a department relates. Bevir and Rhodes (2010, p134) maintain that ‘little of 
note’ has been written about ministers and their government departments. While the literature on 
policy networks (see Rhodes, 1999, for a review of the literature) might be thought to be valuable, in 
practice this is directed at examining how networks contribute to policy-making, assessing questions 
of power and relationships between policy actors. Rhodes (2011, p235-6) briefly examines how 
ministers seek to engage with or mobilise their departments’ ‘client groups’, as they are termed, but 
this is a rare and fleeting example. Discussions of the NHS and of the Police as systems in Bevir and 
Rhodes (2006) leave ministers largely out of the picture. Ministers are ‘missing links’ in academic 
research (Pollitt, 2006). 
Yet in identifiable areas – education and health certainly, ministers are leaders not of policy 
networks but of whole systems. In seeking school reform, for example, they need to engage widely 
beyond their department with a whole system to project their objectives and seek buy-in for these.  
As the emphasis has shifted increasingly from policy to delivery in politics, it is this role of system 
leadership which we must consider, and it is system leadership which is key to understanding the 
role of ministers in innovation. I borrow the language of system leadership from education, and 
particularly from the writings of Michael Fullan about school reform (Andrews, 2014, p38; and 
Hopkins,2007). Fullan has been an advocate of ‘tri-level reform’ – the three levels being the school, 
local government and central government. His interest is in building the ‘collective capacity’ of a 
system (2010, p 3). It is an approach that recognises the role of leadership throughout the system – 
‘distributed leadership’ (see Harris, 2013) .For Fullan: 
 For the entire system to be on the move, you need relentless, resolute leadership from the 
top – leadership that focuses on the right things and above all promotes collective capacity 
and ownership. (p13). 
Fullan says the role of government ‘is to set the direction, even in an assertive way’ (p100) and then 
engage in a dialogue with other actors within the system, and politicians have to be prepared 
themselves to learn along the way. Seddon (2014), indeed, says politicians should get out of 
management and focus mainly in the purpose of public service. Fullan has also spoken about the 
importance of learning from those who are resistant to change, first, because they may have new 
ideas that have not previously been considered; second, because they will have an impact on the 
politics of implementation (Fullan, 2001, p. 43-3). Examples of system reform programmes and the 
practical engagements of Ministers to undertake it can be found in Baker (1993) Blunkett (2006) 
Barber, (2007), Adonis, (2012) and Andrews, (2014). In the context of system leadership, looking at 
how different education ministers have seen their role in the context of a wider system, could be 
valuable. Ministers, then, don’t only exist as actors within a government, a department, a legislature, 
or a policy network: in certain roles, they are leaders of a system, and they are recognised in that 
role by other members of that system. Sectoral journals include them in their lists of the most 
powerful actors within the sector. Institutions within the sector accord them effective status through 
invitations to speak at annual conferences or launch events. Their speeches are analysed and used as 
the basis for policy or delivery engagement, or scoured for signals as to emerging agendas. It is 
interesting to note that the language of system leadership is now emerging into broader use (See 
Senge et al, 2015): in the UK, the RSA is urging public service reformers to ‘think like a system, act 
like an entrepreneur’ (Taylor, 2016; Burbridge, 2017). In summary, they say: 
However we conceive of, manage and deliver public services, we need to understand and 
appreciate the wider systemic perspective in order to be responsive to local needs and 
context. We do not expect — nor advise — anyone to take on grand societal challenges in 
their entirety. Instead, we would rather see people, teams and organisations develop an 
ability to identify opportunities for change and a capacity to react nimbly to them, rapidly 
prototyping and deploying possible responses. 
Barber and Fullan (2005) called for system leadership based on continuous reflective action: 
We need in our view to engage systems leaders in systems thinking in action. In general 
terms this means that state level leaders—Presidents, Prime Ministers, Premiers, Ministers, 
Governors, State Superintendents, Director Generals, Deputy Ministers, and the like—must 
go beyond accountability to foster capacity-building.  
They see the establishment of moral purpose as a key starting point for system leaders, and regular 
communication about goals and objectives. Their recommendations for reforming system leaders 
have much in common with the Mulgan/Albury goals for political leaders in respect of innovation. 
Sorensen and Torfing (2015, 156) argue that the need for ‘multi-actor collaboration’ in promoting 
innovation requires more distributive, horizontal, collaborative and integrative leadership. A system 
focus is also important as the nature of systems themselves may pose specific challenges to the 
adoption or non-adoption and transfer of innovations.  
The dimensions of ministerial time 
Temporal issues are a major factor in the freedom of ministers to innovate. Pierson (2004) warns 
‘Political actors, facing the pressures of the immediate, or skeptical about their capacity to engineer 
long-term effects, may pay limited attention to the long-term’. The dimensions of ministerial time 
include: 
- The day-to-day pressures of the job 
- The knowledge of transience in any particular ministerial role 
- Time as history (1): the accumulated responsibilities of the department over the ages 
- Time as history (2): as an element in judging ministers’ legacies 
 
The former head of Tony Blair’s strategic communications unit, Peter Hyman, once wrote: ‘too often 
in government the urgent crowds out the important’ (2005). It is a refrain which can be traced back 
to US President Eisenhower and the balancing of the urgent and important has become a standard 
text in business management (Eisenhower, 1961). Smith et al identify time as a resource for civil 
servants, but a constraint for ministers. (Smith, 1999). Rhodes identifyies that at most 20% of a UK 
Minister’s day can be spent on policy issues – and says that is probably an overestimate (2011:102). 
Ministers in the UK systems of government are of course also constituency or regional 
representatives, and in time terms there can certainly be a problem of role conflict, but it can mean 
that ministers get direct feedback on the operation of a public service from their constituents in a 
way that their officials will not. Wicks (2012) analysed his own experience as a minister and stressed 
the ‘mundane’ and the ‘routine’ as taking up a considerable amount of time – such as the signing of 
correspondence. He recorded ‘one fundamental fact about ministerial life is that it is an exceedingly 
busy one’, stress the short-cuts which ministers must effect to make judgements. 
Ministers are transients in government departments, so their judgements of time are not only 
conditioned by the day-to-day. They are also conscious of the time they have to make an impact, 
before they may move portfolios, lose their jobs or face an election: they need to make early 
assessments of how best to use their time (Rose, 1975). In the UK government specifically, churn 
amongst ministers is frequent (Cleary and Reeves, 2009): for example, there were 13 housing 
ministers between 1995 and 2015 (Raynsford, 2016). These factors explain why politicians may 
operate, to borrow an expression from US presidential politics, as though they are in a permanent 
campaign (Kelly, 1993). Michael D.Higgins, now the President of Ireland, reflecting on his role as the 
Irish culture minister, said: 
I’ve had to now develop an economy of what I am doing, and I am trying to pull back for 
more consideration of what I am doing and I have a very definite set of priorities. (Kelly, 
1994) 
Pierson (2004) has argued the case for developing a stronger theoretical framework for considering 
political decision-making in temporal terms, stating that ‘history matters’. He demands 
we turn to an examination of history because social life unfolds over time. Real social 
processes have distinctly temporal dimensions. 
Pierson focuses on four main dimensions of time: path dependence; issues of timing and sequence; 
the significance of slow-moving processes; problems of institutional origins and change. These 
concepts could be helpful in considering two specific aspects of the ministerial dimension of time: 
the history of the accumulated legacy of departmental responsibilities and history as the identified 
eventual legacy of ministerial effort.  
When ministers come into ministries, they are not generally able to declare ‘Year Zero’ and start 
everything from scratch, even after the election of a new government replacing one which has been 
in power for over a decade. Rose (1987) points to the importance of what he terms ‘inertia’ in 
government departments, saying ‘a minister usually inherits a conglomerate set of responsibilities 
that have accumulated over decades, generations, or even centuries.’ Wicks points out that 
decisions he was taking in respect of welfare were set within frameworks dating back to the early 
twentieth century reforms of Lloyd George (Wick, 2012). Inertia is important – it allows government 
to carry on, even in elections and between governments. It provides an institutional framework for 
the practice of governing: ‘a ministry institutionalizes standard operating procedures for carrying out 
a multitude of programmes’. That is not to say that ministries are good at preserving corporate 
memory, or as good as they should be (Andrews, 2014; Hillman, 2016).  
If we turn to history as the identified eventual legacy of ministerial effort, we have to ask a key 
question about the durability of innovation. Over what time-scale does an innovation become 
embedded? Smith et al (1999) suggest that certain ministers can be thought of as ‘agenda 
institutionalisers’ if their innovations in departmental agendas last longer than one minister’s term. 
When should we judge an innovation’s success or failure? Does it require bi-partisan acceptance?. 
The Strategy Unit Cabinet Paper gives as historic examples the founding of the National Health 
Service and the creation of the Open University. Though both were innovations, it’s not clear that 
the language of innovation was present at their birth- indeed, taking a historical perspective, as 
Pollitt suggests, may require us to think carefully about when old innovations were new. 
In her analysis of the development of electricity and early electronic technologies, Marvin (1988) 
reminds us that the language adopted at the development of new technological innovations matters 
for the construction of debates around the innovation itself and who is recognised as having 
expertise over it. Similar things happen at the introduction of new institutional innovations. Lowndes 
and Roberts (2013) identify the power of narrative in setting terms for debate around institutions:  
‘Narratives embody values, ideas and power‘. However, it is worth reflecting that in the Cabinet 
Paper with which Bevan persuaded Attlee’s Cabinet finally to sign off his plans for an NHS Bill 
(National Archives, 1945) innovation is not one of the phrases Bevan uses. Instead, he speaks of 
‘reconstruction’ ‘new forms of executive machinery’ and a ‘coherent single new service’: the 
moment of 1945, ‘the new Jerusalem’ comes to shape the narrative around the NHS for thirty years 
at least (Kynaston, 2008). While the language of political innovation may have come more to the 
fore in the last twenty years, there were political innovations – and political innovators - before the 
language of innovation was extensively deployed in political rhetoric and narrative.  
However, ministers as political innovators have not been systematically analysed. There is nothing to 
set against the work by Doig and Hargrove on government entrepreneurs in the USA, for example, or 
even Donahue’s review (2008) of the work of Robert Reich as Secretary of Labor in the Clinton 
Administration, though it would be relatively straightforward to construct a strong list of political 
innovators just in the UK. Borins (2001) notes the importance of political support from above for 
innovators throughout a system. Gatehouse and Price (2013) note that ‘Wales has historically been a 
powerhouse of innovation’. As Wales’s Public Service Minister, for example, I identified just from our 
own small country a series of strong public service entrepreneurs: Lloyd George as Chancellor; 
Viscount Rhondda as First World War Food Controller; Elizabeth Andrews as campaigner for pit-head 
baths and nursery schools; Jim Griffiths and Social Security; Aneurin Bevan and the NHS (Andrews, 
2015). Burnham and Jones (2000) looked at innovators in Ten Downing Street, examining a selection 
of both Prime Ministers and civil servants, examining innovations which had a meaningful duration 
or as they call it ‘continuity in innovation’ – but this is a rare analysis of politicians as innovators. 
Revisiting the Mulgan-Albury ministerial role criteria 
Mulgan says that we need to consider ‘which innovations are good and which are bad.’ Hartley 
points out that not all innovations are valuable. Borins (2014) warns of the danger of vanity projects. 
In making a more forensic distinction between innovative and incremental service improvement, 
Osborne and Brown (2011) warn against the danger of seeing any ‘innovation’ as a good thing, 
correctly identifying that innovation has come to be seen as ‘a normative good’. Sorensen urges us 
to avoid seeing ‘innovation’ as ‘a goal in itself’. Instead, it should be seen as a means to an end 
‘which is to transform the content of what is considered as public value as well as the conditions 
under which this content is formulated and authorized.’ She sees innovations as involving not only 
new ideas but also things which create a step-change (see also Sorensen and Torfing, date).  
Stoker and John (2009) have questioned whether political science can design solutions.  The 
emergence of randomised control trials and design thinking in government, assessing different 
models for public service reform (Halpern, 2015) with new innovations tested at beta-stage against 
user experience suggests a more experimental culture of innovation which is intended to avoid 
transformational innovations that are untested becoming too deep-rooted and too expensive to 
reverse if they fail or are less than optimal.  Applying this to the original Mulgan/Albury role 
identification for ministers therefore suggests a further objective: critically assessing the public value 
of potential innovations. 
Since the election of the 2010 Coalition Government, there have been different parties in power at 
Wales and Westminster. Early on in the life of the UK coalition government, I had my first meeting, 
as Wales’s education minister, with the new UK Secretary of State for Education, Michael Gove. In 
that meeting, I told him that one of the advantages of devolution was that it allowed England to be a 
laboratory for experiments (Andrews, 2014). This examination of certain of the concepts identified 
with public service innovation leads me therefore to suggest one additional role for ministers and 
political leaders: a questioning role, testing innovations against their contribution to public value. 
That might in itself be a useful systemic role for ministers in any case. 
 
Devolution as a policy laboratory – the case of Wales 
According to Rose (1987), in the era of big government – i.e. following the major post-war expansion 
of the British state – there was less scope for ministers to build reputations by creating significant 
innovations than it was when Bevan drew up the plans for the National Health Service. Programmes 
of devolution to the nations of the UK and decentralisation to city mayors since then may contradict 
that view. Certainly, it was the view of the late Rhodri Morgan, former First Minister of Wales, that 
devolution offered the opportunity for four ‘living laboratories’ throughout the UK for policy 
development. (WASC, 2010). The extent to which this has happened has been examined in Keating 
et al (2012) and McCormick (2013). 
Devolution in the UK will be twenty years old in 2019. It is now part of the UK’s contemporary 
history. The approaching twenty-year anniversary provides a valuable vantage-point from which to 
assess whether the hopes that devolution would provide us with ‘living laboratories’ have been 
fulfilled. Devolution, of course, in Sorensen’s terms (2017) is itself a policy innovation. UK-based 
organisations such as the Alliance for Useful Evidence (AUE) and the Institute for Government (IfG) 
have sought to assist the evidence transfer and policy learning around innovative policies and 
practices between governments across the UK. (AUE, 2015b; IfG, 2015; Paun et al, 2016). While 
there is a long way to go on this agenda, there are some recent signs that there have been attempts 
to widen Whitehall’s understanding of the devolved administrations, their role, and the necessary 
interaction between them and Whitehall. (Jones, 2016). This has particularly been the case at the 
level of the Policy Profession network within the UK and devolved governments (Pendlebury, 2016).  
Each of the devolved administrations has different powers and responsibilities, and each has 
developed in its own way. The original devolution settlements were different at the outset and have 
developed unevenly, with political circumstances, such as the Scottish independence referendum, 
changing governments at Westminster, and a culture of testing arrangements in the context of 
experience and review, provoking revision of the status quo. In the case of Wales, the original 
system, based on a transfer of the Secretary of State’s powers and control over quangoes, has been 
significantly re-shaped following the 2006 Government of Wales Act, the subsequent 2011 
referendum winning support for primary law-making powers, and the granting of powers over 
certan kinds of taxes in 2017. 
Within the UK system there are formal  and informal channels which allow for the exchange of 
information and innovative ideas. So, for example, the British-Irish Council has provided a series of 
formal opportunities for engagement between ministers across the devolved nations (and the 
governments of Ireland, the Isle of Many, Guernsey and Jersey over a variety of functions and issues, 
from policy to services, from childcare to minority language policy (BIC, 2017). Ministers from 
different jurisdictions have also visited each other on a bilateral basis, or held telephone 
conferences,  to discuss policy and services. (Andrews 2014). On occasion, policy innovations by the 
UK Government, which have taken England as the default for more wide-ranging reform, have 
provoked reactions from devolved administrations, for example on welfare reform, the Remploy 
factories or exam reform (Andrews, 2014), some of which have required discssion within the Joint 
Ministerial Committee (JMC, 2012). Other infromal channels for dialogue have been opened, for 
example through the auspices of the Alliance for Useful Evidence and the Institute for Government 
(Andrews, 2015; AUE, 2015; Paun et al, 2016). 
However, despite these formal and informal links, there has been little examination of how 
innovations have travelled within the UK, let alone what has been the role of devolved or central 
government ministers in promoting innovation. There is almost a blank canvas for future 
researchers. As I suggest elsewhere (Andrews, 2017) further analysis of policy learning on innovative 
practice across the UK, on the lines of work on the smoking bans (Cairney, 2009), would be useful.  
Gatehouse and Price (2013) mention a series of Welsh innovations post-devolution. I will briefly 
examine two which can most obviously be said to have travelled across the UK, have durability, and 
to have contributed to the creation of public value. These were the creation of the Children’s 
Commissioner for Wales during the first Assembly (CWilliams, 2005) and the implementation of 
regulations permitting the 5p levy on plastic bags passed in the Third Assembly but coming into 
effect in the Fourth Assembly. While children’s commissioners existed in several other jurisdictions 
around the world, this was the first such role in the UK. The former has been analysed by 
Hollingsworth and Douglas (2002). Their examination illustrates the difficulty of assessing the 
ministerial role: the proposal was first mentioned as a recommendation in the Waterhouse review of 
child abuse in north Wales children’s homes and the proposal developed during the First Assembly, 
when the National Assembly was a corporate body with no formal legal distinction between 
legislature and executive (Hollingsowrh and Douglas, p.73).  Informal recognition of a separation 
between legislature and executive had been achieved following the succession of Rhodri Morgan to 
the post of First Minister and his announcement of the formation of a Welsh Assembly Government 
(Morgan, 2017). The proposal was discussed within the committee structure of the first Assembly, 
and the request then conveyed to the Secretary of State for Wales and UK parliamentary legislation 
brought forward and passed through an amendment to the Care Standards Bill and subsequently 
broadened with the passage of the Childrens Commissioner for Wales Act 2001 – the first 
parliamentary Act passed after the opening of the National Assembly for Wales in 1999 
(Hollingsworth and Douglas, 2002). 
 In the case of the 5p charge for plastic bags, this has been found to have been both a popular 
(Poortinga et al, 2013) and successful measure (Thomas et al, 2016; Welsh Government, 2016), 
leading to a reduction in plastic bag usage. It was adopted at a later stage of the devolution process, 
when there was clear separation between legislature and executive, making it easier to assess 
ministerial agency. Again, Wales was not the first country in the world to adopt such a charging 
mechanism to reduce usage of plastic bags, but it was the first in the UK. This has been widely 
acknowledged (eg House of Commons, 2014; Rutter, 2016). Wales’s First Minister from 2009, 
Carwyn Jones, a former Environment Minister, had included the idea in his manifesto for the 
leadership of Welsh Labour in November 2009, saying he wanted ‘to send a clear message that my 
government will not tolerate a throw away society’ (Jones, 2009). During the course of his election 
campaign for the Welsh Labour leadership he championed the proposal including in meetings with 
the CBI in Wales (private information). The adoption of the regulations in 2010 therefore had clear 
leadership support from the top, though curiously, the senior Welsh civil servant in charge of the 
environment department failed to mention that in his summary of the measure for civil servants 
across the UK (Quinn, 2014).  Other nations in the UK subsequently followed Wales. 
Here we have two examples, drawn from different time-periods in the life of the devolution in 
Wales, one of which demonstrates clearly a level of ministerial agency in the adoption of the 
innovation. The Welsh Government has regularly had to defend its own policies and approach, 
particularly since the advent of the Coalition Government in 2010, with its pro-austerity politics, and 
significant policy divergence. Sometimes this has meant a defence of Welsh innovations, such as the 
Welsh Baccalaureate – on other occasions, it has meant resistance to initiatives developed in 
England but not adopted in Wales, such as Academy Schools, or policies intended for UK-wide or 
Britain-wide implementation (Universal Credit, sanctioning of benefit claimants) without 
consideration of the different circumstances of and structures of the devolved nations. This means 
of course that issues of power are never far from the implementation and defence of innovation. 
Sometimes the Welsh Government’s own initiatives have brought it under challenge from local 
government within Wales, such as on its Recycling targets, where Wales leads the UK (Messenger, 
2017). The resistance to untested innovations from elsewhere, whether they are Universal Credit or 
Free Schools, may also confirm that there is an additional role required of ministers or political 
leaders in testing out innovative ideas for their contribution to public value.  
I have adopted a different typology from Hartley or the Australian Public Service Network to 
illustrate a range of innovations in Wales. It should be stressed that this is an illustrative, not a 
comprehensive list. From my own inside knowledge and understanding, I would argue that most of 
this list was minister-led. In the absence of significant extant data on innovation in Wales post-
devolution, indeed in the absence of significant academic research overall, I offer this as a tentative 
starting point for further research. My assessment is based on published works (Andrews, 2014; 
2017a; Gatehouse and Price, 2013; Morgan, 2017), presentations (Andrews 2017b and 2017c) and 
unpublished contemporaneous diaries and notes. In offering this initial taxonomy I am obviously 
aware of the pitfalls of personal reflection as a data source, which have been widely discussed 
(sources). However, I am equally conscious that without the availability of first-hand reflection in the 
form of memoirs, biographical material, interviews and diaries, it sometimes takes time for data to 
surface for analysis. The value of biographical material as data for analysis and theory is contested 
but comparative biography has been seen as a more purposeful route for theoretical development. 
(Theakston, 1999; 2000)). Bevir and Rhodes (2010, p134 n3) list first-hand sources which they found 
particularly valuable in gaining insight into governing practices. Borins (2011) urges the value of the 
study of narrative in public administration. I offer this reflection as a contribution to a growing body 
of research about political leadership, seeking to situate it in the context of wider research on 
ministers, on the post-1997 emphasis on innovation in the public sector, and on devolution (in Wales 
in particular). Others can interrogate my personal ‘fieldwork’ (Bevir and Rhodes, 2010, p 209).  
 
 
Type Example 
Product  Welsh Baccalaureate 
Service  Online learning environment for 
schools (Hwb) 
 Free Breakfasts in primary schools in 
poorer areas 
 Free prescriptions 
 Tuition Fee Grants 
Process  Organ Donation Act – opt-out, not opt-
in (‘deemed consent’) 
 Randomised Control Trials 
 One Welsh Public Service values 
Programme  Re-Act fund for companies forced into 
lay-offs 
 Pro-act fund for training subsidies 
 Jobs Growth Wales 
 Foundation Phase for 3-7 Year Olds 
 Flying Start Programme for earliest 
years 
Strategic  Well-being of Future Generations Act 
 Violence against Women Act 
 Recycling targets 
Governance  Children’s Commissioner 
 Community Mutuals in Housing 
Instrumental  ‘Plastic bag tax’ 
 Land Transaction Tax 
Institutional  Public Policy Institute for Wales 
 Natural Resources Wales 
Innovation Incentives  Digital Innovation Fund 
 Innovate to Save Fund 
 Welsh Language Technology Fund 
 
These can be grouped against the original Cabinet Office suggested roles for ministers and political 
leaders. Again, this is illustrative, not exhaustive. 
 
Role Welsh Innovations 
 Setting and relentlessly communicating 
clear and aspirational outcomes for the 
organisations and areas for which they 
are responsible 
 
 Well-being of Future Generations Act 
 Violence against Women Act 
 
 Creating and exemplifying a culture 
which encourages new ideas wherever 
they may come from 
 
 Innovation Funds 
 One Welsh Public Service Values 
 Creating the legislative and policy 
framework to promote 
experimentation and piloting 
 Randomised Control Trials 
 One Welsh Public Service values 
  Innovation Funds 
 Well-being of Future Generations Act 
 Supporting and defending experiments 
and high risk pilots 
 
 Recycling Obligations 
 Organ Donation Act 
 Welsh Baccalaureate 
 Viewing national, regional and 
organisational devolution as 
‘laboratories of innovation’ 
 Tuition Fee Grants 
 Plastic Bag Tax 
 Public Policy Institute for Wales 
 Free Breakfasts in primary schools in 
poorer areas 
 Free prescriptions 
 Galvanising others, championing and 
chivvying promising innovations 
 
 Innovate to Save 
 Other Innovation Funds 
 Recycling targets 
 Community Mutuals in Housing 
 
 Developing visionary goals and driving 
them through (e.g. John F. Kennedy’s 
‘Man on the Moon in a decade’) 
 Recycling targets 
 Plastic Bag Tax 
 Foundation Phase for 3-7 year-olds 
 Questioning innovations and assessing 
their public value contribution 
 Dropping the One Laptop per school 
pupil after its pilot phase 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper I have sought to look critically at existing research on innovation and its relationship to 
political leadership, and to develop further the initial typology advanced by Mulgan and Albury in   
work on the development of thinking on innovation in the New Labour period in particular, 
academic work on innovation and public value, political science literature on the agency of ministers, 
work from within the education policy field on ministers as system leaders, analysis of the role of 
time and history in assessments of ministerial contributions, and research on innovations within 
Wales post-devolution. I conclude that while there is little direct available work on which to build a 
theory of political leadership for public value in innovation, the Mulgan/Albury work is a useful 
starting point but needs to developed. I add one new dimension, which is about leadership 
judgement on the value of particular innovations.  
None of this work is exhaustive or conclusive. This is an emergent field. There is a need for 
quantitative research into the ministerial role in innovation. Qualitative historical analysis of case 
studies and comparative biography of ministerial innovators would be valuable, including the 
analysis of first-person narratives to see how ministers themselves conceptualize their role in 
innovation development. It would be instructive to look at whether the timing of ministerial 
appointment (immediately post-election, or mid-term, or post a change of leader) affects a 
minister’s approach to innovation, or whether specific departments lend themselves more easily to 
innovative practice or leadership. Are specific traits associated with ministerial propensity to 
innovate? Are specific kinds of innovations more likely to be associated with ministerial leadership?  
Innovations might be examined and compared within existing sectors such as education or health. 
The devolved nations of the UK may provide a useful context for the evaluation of innovations over 
(soon) a twenty-year period.  
Borins (2014) writes about ‘the persistence of innovation. Sorensen and Torfing (2015) point out that 
‘contrary to classical public administration theory’, the public sector generates a lot of innovation.  
Wegrich and Lodge (2014, p108) argue that ‘the public sector is more adaptable to change and 
innovation than it tends to be given credit’. They make the point that the governance administrative 
capabilities may be the missing link between the public administration and innovation literatures. If 
we are soon able to look back on twenty years of devolution, it may be that we will conclude that 
public innovation is ordinary: it has become a routine part of governmental practice. If we consider 
the history of public innovation before New Public Management, before Reinventing Government, 
before New Labour’s Modernising Government programme, it may be that we will reflect that it 
always was. Public value has historically been created by governments that were open to innovation 
and prepared to allow their ministers to innovate, to encourage others who could, or to adapt ideas 
from those who had. Arguably, it may have been like that before either innovation or public value 
become ‘buzz-words’.  
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